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INTRODUCTION 
From 2011 to 2012, JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPMorgan) converted its 
hedging operations into a high-risk, large-volume trading operation that 
nose-dived into more than $6.2 billion in losses.1 The London Whale 
debacle is a cautionary tale that is alarming not only given the large losses 
but also because it implicated the risk management operations of the United 
States’ largest bank holding company at a time, just a few years following 
the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression, when one would 
expect the finest diligence by both bank management and bank regulators. 
Scrutiny of financial institutions and their regulators remains high even 
while the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009 begins to feel like history. 
Scandals involving large financial institutions, like London Whale, 
continue to make headline news. Wells Fargo’s account opening scandal is 
a very recent example. In the fall of 2016, Wells Fargo announced that it 
paid over $185 million in fines to the City of Los Angeles and to federal 
regulators to settle claims related to the bank opening millions of fake bank 
accounts in order to generate fee income.2 The repercussions of the scandal 
continue3 with congressional hearings,4 the resignation of John Stumpf, 
former Wells Fargo CEO, further federal investigations,5 and mounting 
litigation.6 
Scrutiny of bank management is not only appropriate because banks 
sometimes, like in the case of Wells Fargo’s account scandal, cheat their 
 
1.  For a full exploration, see PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. SENATE, 
113TH CONG., JPMORGAN CHASE WHALE TRADES: A CASE HISTORY OF DERIVATIVES RISKS AND 
ABUSES (2013), http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/report-jpmorgan-chase-whale-trades-a-case-
history-of-derivatives-risks-and-abuses-march-15-2013 [hereinafter Senate Report]. 
2.  See Press Release, Wells Fargo, Wells Fargo Issues Statement on Agreements Related to Sales 
Practices (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.wellsfargo.com/about/press/2016/sales-practices-
agreements_0908.content. 
3.  Even Saturday Night Live hopped on the Wells Fargo bandwagon featuring a skit with Lin-
Manuel Miranda as the conniving Wells Fargo man. See Saturday Night Live: Wells Fargo Wagon, 
(NBC television broadcast Oct. 8, 2016), http://www.nbc.com/saturday-night-live/video/wells-fargo-
wagon/3112633?snl=1. 
4.  The House Financial Services Committee held hearings on September 29, 2016. See 
Memorandum from the FSC Majority Committee Staff to the Members of the Committee on Financial 
Services (Sept. 26, 2016), http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/092916_fc_memo.pdf 
(setting date for hearing on “Holding Wall Street Accountable”). The Senate Banking Committee held 
hearings on September 20, 2016. An Examination of Wells Fargo’s Unauthorized Accounts and the 
Regulatory Response, U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFF. (Sept. 20, 
2016, 10:00 AM), http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/hearings?ID=B80F9B81-4331-
4F95-91BC-718288EC9DA0. 
5.  See Emily Glazer & Christopher M. Matthews, Federal Prosecutors Investigating Wells 
Fargo Over Sales Tactics, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 14, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/federal-
prosecutors-investigating-wells-fargo-over-sales-tactics-1473881424. 
6.  See James Rufus Koren, Wells Fargo Hit with Multiple Lawsuits Involving Bogus Accounts, 
Aggressive Sales Quotas, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2016, 5:40 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-
fi-wells-class-action-20160926-snap-story.html. 
7 SCHOONER 1011-1028 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/12/2017 12:51 PM 
2017] Big Bank Boards 1013 
customers, or, like in the case of London Whale, lose lots of money by 
taking outsized risks. Poor bank management can have broader 
implications because of spillover effects that can disrupt segments of the 
economy (in the case of smaller banks)7 and the entire economy (in the 
case of large banks).8 For this reason, all banks are subject to extensive 
regulation, enjoy the benefits of deposit insurance, and are granted access 
to the Federal Reserve as lender of last resort. The Financial Crisis 
illustrated the fact that the financial distress of a non-bank can also be 
disruptive. Therefore, when Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank),9 it gave the Federal 
Reserve new authority to regulate certain non-bank financial institutions 
designated by the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC).10 At the 
same time, Congress recognized that large bank holding companies can 
cause greater disruption to the economy than smaller ones and, 
consequently, should be subjected to a more rigorous prudential regime 
than smaller banks. Thus, Dodd-Frank directs the Federal Reserve to 
subject large bank holding companies with assets of $50 billion or more 
and non-bank financial institutions designated by FSOC to greater 
supervision than that applied to smaller bank holding companies.11 This 
Article directs attention to the enforcement implications of the heightened 
system of supervision on liability of banks’ directors—in particular, the 
liability created through statutory administrative enforcement. 
This Article first considers the possible liability of the JPMorgan board 
in the London Whale matter. This discussion is not meant to assign liability 
in that case. Rather, the London Whale episode is considered as a 
springboard to a broader discussion of big bank officer and director 
liability. While it may be tempting to shrug off the regulatory implications 
of the London Whale episode because the losses did not threaten the 
solvency of JPMorgan, the significance of such management failures 
should not be ignored. Effective management of large banks is essential to 
financial stability. The type of poor management potentially at play in the 
London Whale matter could implicate the effectiveness of management in 
areas that have significant financial stability implications. For example, 
while London Whale suggests lax management in the bank’s trading 
 
7.  For a discussion of the impact of community bank failure on regional and local economies, see 
Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Regulating Angels, 50 GA. L. REV. 143, 145–46, 150–52 (2015). 
8.  For a discussion of the economic consequences of the Financial Crisis, see FIN. CRISIS 
INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 215, 
389–410 (2011), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf. 
9.  Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
10.  See 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a) (2012). 
11.  See id. § 5365(a). 
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operations, this could be a red flag regarding management deficiencies in 
other areas of operations such as cybersecurity or data management.12 
Since effective bank management is essential to financial stability, 
consideration of incentives for effective management, like the personal 
liability of officers and directors, remains an important issue. 
Following the discussion of the litigation in the London Whale case, 
this Article moves on to consider the existing administrative enforcement 
powers of the banking agencies and how these powers might be applied in 
a case of risk management failure. This Article uses the London Whale 
experience to explore the statutory opportunities as well as challenges 
faced by the banking agencies in utilizing their administrative enforcement 
powers. 
Finally, this Article considers bank director liability in the context of 
the enhanced supervisory regime put in place following the Financial 
Crisis. Traditional mechanisms for monitoring management behavior, in 
the form of shareholder derivative claims of breach of fiduciary duty, are 
not well suited to the task of monitoring bank managers’ effectiveness in 
limiting the externalities that lead to financial instability. While the purpose 
of agency enforcement powers is squarely prudential (i.e., meant to ensure 
the safe and sound operation of financial institutions), current 
administrative enforcement powers do not appropriately supplement and 
support Congress’s vision of enhanced supervision of large banks. In 
particular, the fact that negligent or grossly negligent behavior does not 
trigger the agencies’ removal or prohibition power undermines the goals of 
enhanced supervision of large banks. 
I. LONDON WHALE RISK MANAGEMENT FAILURE 
Consider the officers and directors of JPMorgan Chase circa 2012. 
These are the managers whose responsibilities included oversight of an 
outsized high-risk trading13 operation run by JPMorgan’s Chief Investment 
Office (CIO) that resulted in a $6.2 billion loss to the bank. A Senate 
Subcommittee report on the London Whale matter included alarming 
findings regarding the bank’s risk management practices.14 Among other 
 
12.  Cybersecurity and data deficiencies are two of seven key threats to financial stability 
identified by the Office of Financial Research. OFFICE OF FIN. RESEARCH, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
2016 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT 2 (2016), https://www.financialresearch.gov/financial-stability-
reports/files/OFR_2016_Financial-Stability-Report.pdf. The other five threats identified are: potential 
spillovers from Europe; risks in U.S. nonfinancial corporate credit; central counterparties as contagion 
channels; pressure on U.S. life insurance companies; and systemic footprints of largest U.S. banks. Id. 
13.  For a discussion of whether the trades were for speculative or hedging purposes, see CLAIRE 
A. HILL & RICHARD W. PAINTER, BETTER BANKERS, BETTER BANKS: PROMOTING GOOD BUSINESS 
THROUGH CONTRACTUAL COMMITMENT 44–46 (2015). 
14.  See Senate Report, supra note 1, at 153–214. 
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findings, the Senate Report explains that JPMorgan’s risk management 
systems included a number of risk limits (e.g., a limit tied to VaR 
models15). These limits were set by bank executives and regularly 
discussed by the Board of Director’s Risk Policy Committee. Breaches of 
risk limits were meant to trigger remedial action but, in practice, served 
more like an early warning system. However it was supposed to operate, 
the system of risk limits failed. According to the Senate Report: “Over the 
course of 2011 and 2012, the SCP [synthetic credit portfolio] breached 
every risk limit that the Subcommittee examined, but none of those 
breaches led to an analysis of whether the portfolio was engaged in overly 
risky trading activities.”16 The Senate Report also describes non-public 
supervisory notices sent by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC) to JPMorgan in which the OCC makes the following assessment of 
the risk management failures: “Management oversight of CIO was 
inadequate. Business management was allowed to operate with little 
effective challenge from either the board or executive management.”17 It 
should be noted that the Senate Report is also critical of the OCC which, 
despite having sixty-five examiners on site at JP Morgan, “failed to notice 
or investigate bank reports of CIO risk limit breaches, failed to realize 
when monthly CIO reports weren’t delivered, failed to insist on detailed 
trading data from the CIO needed for effective oversight, and failed to take 
firm action when the bank delayed or denied its requests for information.”18 
Given the alarming losses and reports of management failure, it comes 
as no surprise that the whale trades generated significant litigation.19 An 
investor class action brought against JPMorgan, Jamie Dimon (CEO), and 
Doug Braunstein (CFO) alleging misleading statements and losses in 
connection with the whale trades settled for $150 million.20 Shareholder 
derivative suits were filed against the board in both Delaware and New 
York but were dismissed on procedural grounds.21 Criminal charges were 
brought against two former JPMorgan traders;22 however, no such charges 
 
15.  Very generally, value at risk (VaR) measures the risk of investments. 
16.  Senate Report, supra note 1, at 159. 
17.  Id. at 212 (quoting OCC Supervisory Letter to JPMorgan Chase on Examination of VaR 
Model Risk Management PSI-OCC-17-000015 (Nov. 6, 2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
18.  Id. at 250. 
19.  It is beyond the scope of this Article to conclude that the litigation was or was not successful. 
20.  See John Kennedy, $150M ‘London Whale’ Settlement Gets Judge’s OK, LAW360 (May 10, 
2016, 3:29 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/794169/150m-london-whale-settlement-gets-judge-s-
ok. 
21.  See Stephanie Russell-Kraft, Del. Chancery Judge Tosses ‘London Whale’ Derivative Suit, 
LAW360 (May 22, 2015, 5:41 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/659384/del-chancery-judge-
tosses-london-whale-derivative-suit. 
22.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Announces Charges Filed Against 
Two Derivatives Traders in Connection with Multi-Billion Dollar Trading Loss at JPMorgan Chase & 
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have been brought against executive officers or members of the board. The 
Federal Reserve,23 OCC,24 Securities and Exchange Commission,25 and the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission26 all extracted civil money 
penalties from the bank itself; none have brought any action against the 
board. 
Corporate governance scholars would see the London Whale case as an 
ideal vehicle for exploring the nature of directors’ duties of oversight and 
good faith27 as developed by the Delaware courts—often referred to as 
Caremark duties.28 Such claims require a showing of intentional failure to 
act in the face of a known duty to act.29 A plaintiff can show lack of good 
faith in oversight duties by “properly alleging particularized facts that show 
that a director consciously disregarded an obligation to be reasonably 
informed about the business and its risks or consciously disregarded the 
duty to monitor and oversee the business.”30 Shareholders initiated 
derivative suits against JPMorgan’s board claiming, inter alia, bad faith/
lack of proper oversight. Plaintiffs in these derivative suits argued that the 
members of the board violated their oversight duties by failing to 
implement a risk management system that was commensurate with the 
risks associated with the high-volume, speculative trades executed by 
 
Company (Aug. 14, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-charges-filed-
against-two-derivatives-traders-connection-multi. 
23.  Order of Assessment of a Civil Money Penalty Issued Upon Consent at 5, JPMorgan Chase 
& Co., No. 13-031-CMP-HC (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. Sept. 18, 2013), 
http://perma.cc/Y2AC-Q8R7 ($200 million civil money penalty imposed on the bank holding 
company). 
24.  Consent Order for a Civil Money Penalty at 4, JPMorgan Chase Bank, No. AA-EC-2013-75 
(Dep’t of Treasury Comptroller of Currency Sept. 18, 2013), http://perma.cc/PX73-TW38 ($300 million 
civil money penalty imposed on the bank). 
25.  Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings at 19, JP Morgan Chase & Co., Exchange 
Act Release No. 70458, (Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Sept. 19, 2013), 2013 WL 5275772 ($200 million civil 
money penalty imposed on the bank holding company). 
26.  Order Instituting Proceedings at 17, JPMorgan Chase Bank, CFTC No. 14-01 (Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission Oct. 16, 2013), 2013 WL 6057042 ($100 million civil money penalty 
imposed on the bank). 
27.  These duties are viewed as part of a director’s duty of loyalty. While the duty of care would 
be equally implicated in such circumstances because of the potential failure of the board to adequately 
inform itself, duty of care claims are often eliminated from consideration in suits for damages because 
Delaware law allows such claims to be exculpated in the corporate charter. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 
§ 102(b)(7) (2011). This is significant because the lack of good faith, duty of loyalty type of claim 
requires a showing of greater culpability than a duty of care claim. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative 
Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 66 (Del. 2006). 
28.  Chancellor Allen’s opinion in In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation began 
the Delaware court’s exploration of the nature of the board’s oversight duties. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 
1996). 
29.  See Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d at 67. 
30.  In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 125 (Del. Ch. 2009) (emphasis 
omitted). Significantly, the pleading standards under Delaware law require allegation of particularized 
facts. DEL. CHAN. R. 23.1. 
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JPMorgan’s CIO.31 Plaintiffs asserted that the board knew or consciously 
disregarded the fast-growing risk in the CIO.32 
In a suit filed in the Southern District of New York, the court noted that 
the plaintiffs were pursuing a particularly difficult type of oversight claim 
because the nature of the claim was a failure to oversee business risk,33 as 
opposed to, for example, the failure to oversee potential illegal activity. 
The court explained that the plaintiffs would have to allege that the board 
“consciously disregarded red flags signaling that the company’s employees 
were taking facially improper . . . business risks.”34 This high standard of 
liability led to the dismissal of the case on procedural grounds.35 
Substantially similar derivative suits brought in New York and Delaware 
courts were also dismissed at the pleading stage.36 
Observers of the London Whale derivative claims might be critical of 
rulings that terminated the plaintiffs’ claims at the pleading stage. Many of 
those potential objections relate to the longstanding obstacles to bringing 
derivative claims and are well beyond the scope of this Article. More 
particularly relevant to this discussion are the challenges in utilizing 
fiduciary duty principles to address the considerable negative externalities 
generated from the operations of very large financial institutions. Since the 
Financial Crisis, scholars have explored whether shareholder actions 
asserting breach of fiduciary duty can serve to address such externalities. 
Many scholars have concluded that the traditional model, in which 
directors’ duties are measured against the pursuit of maximum shareholder 
value (as measured by stock price), is ill-suited as a measure of proper 
management of a large financial institution whose operations can have 
significant negative spillover effects throughout the economy.37 The 
 
31.  In re JPMorgan Chase & Co. Derivative Litig., No. 12 Civ. 03878(GBD), 2014 WL 
1297824, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2014). 
32.  Id. at *1–*2. 
33.  Id. at *4. 
34.  Id. at *1 (quoting In re Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 5215-VCG, 2011 WL 
4826104, at *22 n.217 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2011)). 
35.  Id. at *7. The plaintiff was unable to allege with particularized facts, at the pleading stage, 
that a majority of the board ignored red flags. This meant that the plaintiffs in this derivative action 
were unable to establish that their demand on the board to bring this action was futile and, therefore, 
excused. Reconsideration of the case was denied. In re JPMorgan Chase & Co. Derivative Litig., No. 
12 Civ. 03878(GBD), 2014 WL 3778181 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2014). 
36.  Asbestos Workers 42 Pension Fund v. Bammann, No. 9772–VCG, 2015 WL 2455469, at *20 
(Del. Ch. May 22, 2015), aff’d 132 A.3d 749 (Del. 2016) (Delaware Chancery Court granted the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss, holding that the plaintiff was collaterally estopped from relitigating 
issues already decided in the New York litigation); Wandel v. Dimon, 135 A.D.3d 515, 518 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2016) (granting defendant’s motion to dismiss based on plaintiffs’ failure to establish demand 
futility). 
37.  See John Armour & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systemic Harms and Shareholder Value, 6 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 35 (2014); Jill E. Fisch, The Mess at Morgan: Risk, Incentives and Shareholder 
Empowerment, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 651 (2015); Hwa-Jin Kim, Financial Regulation and Supervision in 
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discussion that follows begins with the same premise, i.e., that managing 
large financial institutions is different because of the significant 
externalities, but takes that premise one step further by suggesting that 
reimagining the fiduciary duties owed to the corporation is only an indirect 
solution to the externalities associated with poor management. Instead, the 
following redirects the discussion by examining external administrative 
enforcement proceedings as a potential source of board monitoring as 
opposed to internal corporate governance claims. 
II. BANK REGULATORS’ ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT POWERS 
The inability to bring the London Whale derivative claims beyond the 
pleading stage raises the question of whether the banking agencies (as 
opposed to the bank’s shareholders) sought any form of sanction against 
the members of the board. As discussed above, federal agencies imposed 
civil money penalties on JPMorgan, but no administrative enforcement 
actions emerged against bank officers or directors. It is tempting to chalk 
this up to administrative forbearance that stems from some form of 
regulatory capture. And yet, other explanations are perhaps just as likely. 
To enable such evaluation, this Part begins with an overview of the federal 
banking agencies’ administrative enforcement powers and concludes with 
an examination of the actual as well as potential application of such powers 
to the London Whale episode. 
A. Overview of Agency Enforcement Powers 
Perhaps the most high-profile cases brought against bank officers and 
directors by federal regulators are the professional liability claims brought 
by the FDIC as receiver of a failed bank.38 When a bank fails, the FDIC 
steps into the shoes of the failed bank,39 which empowers the FDIC to sue 
the board of directors for breach of their fiduciary duties. Since the FDIC 
sues on behalf of the bank itself, the procedural demand requirements of 
the typical shareholder derivative suit do not apply. Unlike the 
administrative enforcement powers discussed in the remainder of this Part, 
the FDIC’s receivership cases are filed civilly, utilizing statutory authority 
granted to the FDIC to bring such claims for monetary damages, imposing 
liability on directors for gross negligence, and preserving state law claims 
 
Corporate Governance of Banks, 41 J. CORP. L. 707 (2016); Steven L. Schwarcz, Misalignment: 
Corporate Risk-Taking and Public Duty, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2016). 
38.  12 U.S.C. § 1821(c) (2012). 
39.  See id. § 1821(d)(2). 
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with a lower standard of proof, e.g., breach of ordinary care.40 Since 2009, 
the FDIC, as receiver, has authorized suits against 1,216 individual officers 
or directors of failed banks.41 
While the FDIC’s suits against directors of failed banks are the most 
notorious, such cases have limited importance in the context of the 
directors of a large financial institution since such institutions rarely fail.42 
Title II of Dodd Frank expands the FDIC’s receivership powers beyond 
insured depository institutions and grants the FDIC with potential43 
receivership powers44 over bank holding companies and non-bank financial 
companies supervised by the Federal Reserve. Such authority, however, 
remains untested. Therefore, consideration of the administrative liability of 
directors of operating institutions is important because, again, big banks do 
not typically fail and, as seen in the context of the London Whale episode, 
private civil suits against directors may not be successful in monitoring 
board behavior. 
Directors of both failed and operating banks are brought within the 
administrative enforcement powers of the banking agencies45 as 
“institution-affiliated part[ies]” (IAP), which include directors and officers 
of insured depository institutions.46 Three types of administrative 
enforcement proceedings, discussed below, are most relevant to bank 
management: cease-and-desist proceedings, civil money penalties, and 
orders of suspension or prohibition.47 
 
40.  See id. § 1821(k). The statute’s savings clause provides: “Nothing in this paragraph shall 
impair or affect any right of the Corporation under other applicable law.” Id. Discussion of the case law 
determining the meaning of that clause is beyond the scope of this discussion. 
41.  See Professional Liability Lawsuits, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., https://www.fdic.gov/bank/ 
individual/failed/pls/ (last updated Feb. 24, 2017). 
42.  The failure of Washington Mutual (WaMu), with combined assets of $307 billion and total 
deposits of $188 billion, is the largest bank failure in U.S. history. See Robin Sidel et al., WaMu Is 
Seized, Sold Off to J.P. Morgan, In Largest Failure in U.S. Banking History, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 26, 
2008, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122238415586576687. In 2011, the FDIC, as 
receiver, brought suit against former officers and directors of WaMu, claiming negligence, gross 
negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty. FDIC v. Killinger, No. C11–459 MJP, 2011 WL 4440410 
(W.D. Wash. Sept. 21, 2011). The case was settled. 
43.  The authority of the FDIC in such circumstances depends on a systemic risk determination as 
provided under Title II of Dodd Frank. 12 U.S.C. § 5383 (2012). 
44.  Id. § 5390(a). 
45.  The federal banking statutes use the term “appropriate Federal banking agency” (AFBA) to 
identify which federal banking agency has the authority to bring an administrative enforcement action, 
among other things. Id. § 1813(q). The AFBA for a national bank is the OCC; for a state member 
insured bank and any bank holding company, it is the Federal Reserve; for a state nonmember insured 
banks, it is the FDIC. Id. 
46.  Id. § 1813(u)(1). 
47.  Note that the Federal Reserve may utilize all of the enforcement powers discussed above in 
supervising bank holding companies, id. § 1818(b)(3), and designated nonbank financial companies, id. 
§ 5362(a) (“[A] nonbank financial company supervised by the Board of Governors and any subsidiaries 
of such company (other than any depository institution subsidiary) shall be subject to the provisions of 
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The banking agencies have the authority to issue a cease-and-desist 
order against a bank director if the director is engaging, has engaged, or is 
about to engage in an unsafe or unsound banking practice, or has violated a 
law, rule, regulation, or condition imposed in writing by the agency.48 The 
cease-and-desist power includes the authority to require directors to make 
restitution or provide reimbursement, indemnification, or guarantee against 
loss, but only if the director was unjustly enriched or acted in reckless 
disregard of the law.49 
The agencies’ enforcement powers include the authority to remove or 
suspend a bank director from office or prohibit the director from 
participating in the affairs of the bank if the agency determines that: (1) the 
director has, inter alia, violated a law or regulation, engaged in an unsafe or 
unsound banking practice, or breached their fiduciary duty; (2) by reason of 
such violation, practice, or breach, the bank suffered or will probably suffer 
financial loss or other damage, or the interests of the bank’s depositors 
have been or could be prejudiced, or the director has received financial gain 
or other benefit; and (3) the violation, practice, or breach involved personal 
dishonesty or demonstrated willful or continuing disregard by the director 
for the safety or soundness of the bank.50 
Bank directors also face potential liability for three tiers of civil money 
penalties (First Tier penalty of up to $5,000 for each day the violation 
continues; Second Tier up to $25,000 per day; and Third Tier up to 
$1,000,000 per day).51 First Tier penalties are available for any violation of 
law or regulation.52 First Tier violations are significant because they are 
strict liability violations—requiring no proof of culpability, unlike higher 
tier violations. Second Tier penalties require an agency determination of (1) 
a First Tier violation or recklessly engaging in an unsafe or unsound 
practice or breach of fiduciary duty, and (2) that such violation, practice, or 
breach is part of (a) a pattern of misconduct, (b) causes or is likely to cause 
more than minimal loss to the bank, or (c) results in pecuniary gain or other 
benefit to the director.53 Third Tier penalties are available if the agency 
determines that a director (1) knowingly violated a law or regulation or 
 
subsections (b) through (n) of section 1818 of this title, in the same manner and to the same extent as if 
the company were a bank holding company, as provided in section 1818(b)(3) of this title.”). 
48.  Id. § 1818(b)(1). 
49.  Id. § 1818(b)(6). 
50.  Id. § 1818(e)(1). The statute provides for notice and hearing before removal. Id. § 1818(e)(4). 
A director who is subject to a removal or prohibition order is also prohibited from participating in the 
conduct of the affairs of any insured depository institution unless the director received written consent 
from the agencies. Id. § 1818(e)(7)(A)– (B). 
51.  Id. § 1818(i)(2). 
52.  Id. § 1818(i)(2)(A). First Tier penalties are also available based on a violation of any agency 
order, written agreement or condition. Id. 
53.  Id. § 1818(i)(2)(B). 
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engaged in unsafe or unsound practices or breached fiduciary duty and (2) 
either knowingly or recklessly caused a substantial loss to the bank or 
received a substantial pecuniary gain or other benefit by reason of such 
practice.54 
Because the term is specific to banking statutes, a brief overview of the 
meaning of “unsafe or unsound [banking] practices” is appropriate. The 
meaning of unsafe or unsound banking practices has been the subject of 
some debate because Congress never provided a comprehensive definition. 
Courts have often cited legislative history describing the term as follows: 
Like many other generic terms widely used in the law, such as 
“fraud,” “negligence,” “probable cause,” or “good faith,” the term 
“unsafe or unsound practices” has a central meaning which can and 
must be applied to constantly changing factual circumstances. 
Generally speaking, an “unsafe or unsound practice” embraces any 
action, or lack of action, which is contrary to generally accepted 
standards of prudent operation, the possible consequences of 
which, if continued, would be abnormal risk or loss or damage to 
an institution, its shareholders, or the agencies administering the 
insurance funds.55 
Yet, courts’ interpretation of the phrase is not limited to this legislative 
history. The Fifth Circuit, for example, has linked the concept of unsafe or 
unsound banking practices more directly to the institution’s solvency, 
holding that such practices are limited to those “with a reasonably direct 
effect on [a bank’s] financial soundness.”56 
The banking agencies often utilize the administrative enforcement 
powers discussed above. A 2014 study by the Offices of Inspector General 
of the federal banking agencies (OIG Report) analyzed the 275 
administrative enforcement actions brought against institution-affiliated 
parties of failed banks from September 2008 to September 2013.57 The 
most commonly used administrative sanction was removal/prohibition 
(128), then civil money penalties (120), personal cease-and-desist orders 
 
54.  Id. § 1818(i)(2)(C). 
55.  Financial Institutions Supervisory and Insurance Act of 1966: Hearings on S. 3158 and S. 
3695 Before the H. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong. 50 (1966) (memorandum submitted 
by John Horne, Chairman of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board). 
56.  Gulf Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., 651 F.2d 259, 264 (5th Cir. 
1981). For a full discussion of courts’ interpretations of unsafe or unsound banking practices, see Heidi 
Mandanis Schooner, Fiduciary Duties’ Demanding Cousin: Bank Director Liability for Unsafe or 
Unsound Banking Practices, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 175, 190–95 (1995). 
57.  OFFICES OF INSPECTOR GEN., EVAL-14-002, ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS AND PROFESSIONAL 
LIABILITY CLAIMS AGAINST INSTITUTION-AFFILIATED PARTIES AND INDIVIDUALS ASSOCIATED WITH 
FAILED INSTITUTIONS 4 (2014). 
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(19), and, finally, administrative restitution (8).58 The OIG Report noted 
challenges the agencies face in bringing certain actions. With regard to the 
use of removal/prohibition authority, regulators noted the inability to bring 
such actions in the case of poor or negligent conduct.59 The statute requires, 
as discussed above, a higher degree of culpability. The OIG Report also 
notes that the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of “unsafe and unsound 
[banking] practices” limits the scope of administrative enforcement actions 
because such interpretation does not include practices that threaten 
significant loss but do not threaten the viability of the bank.60 With regard 
to these limitations, the OIG Report states that “[t]he Regulators noted that 
because removal/prohibition orders permanently remove IAPs from 
banking, thus, taking away their livelihood, it is appropriate for the legal 
standards to be rigorous.”61 The OIG Report encouraged regulators to 
consider greater use of cease-and-desist orders since the statutory 
requirements for such actions are less rigorous.62 Finally, the OIG Report 
identified a number of other factors limiting actions against IAPs, 
including, among other things: the agencies’ reluctance to bring cases with 
limited chance of success to avoid negative precedent, actions barred by the 
statute of limitations, limited staff resources, and limited resources of the 
respondent to pay civil money penalties or restitution.63 
B. London Whale Administrative Enforcement Actions 
JPMorgan paid civil money penalties in connection with the London 
Whale trades in administrative enforcement actions brought by the four 
federal financial regulators.64 No enforcement actions were brought against 
individual bank officers or directors. Perhaps the simplest explanation for 
the lack of administrative enforcement actions against the officers and 
directors is that the banking agencies did not find any of them culpable—
not even negligent. Yet, the Federal Reserve’s civil money penalty order 
notes deficiencies in the bank’s risk management functions including the 
failure of “senior management’s elevation of issues to the board of 
directors, which did not allow for the board of directors’ meaningful 
consideration of such issues.”65 This finding appears to implicate “senior 
 
58.  Id. at 13. 
59.  Id. at 20. 
60.  Id. at 21. 
61.  Id. at 22. 
62.  Id. at 23. 
63.  Id. at 24–25. 
64.  See supra notes 23–26 and accompanying text. 
65.  Order of Assessment of a Civil Money Penalty, supra note 23, at 2. Of course, this 
observation does not explain the lack of enforcement action against “senior management.” 
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management” (for their failure to “elevate”) but perhaps exculpate 
members of the board of directors (who possibly saw no red flags). Of 
course, in this sort of analysis, it is appropriate to distinguish between 
inside and outside board members, i.e., those board members who are 
officers versus those who are not. In other words, a full analysis would 
require consideration of whether any of those “senior managers” were also 
members of the board. More generally and hypothetically, what if bank 
officers and/or directors were negligent or grossly negligent in overseeing 
the bank’s risk management system? Can the lack of enforcement against 
the officers and directors be explained even under such a scenario? 
With regard to pursuing possible breach of fiduciary duty claims, the 
FDIC, as discussed above, has the most experience bringing such cases, but 
only as a receiver for a failed bank. With regard to operating institutions, 
breach of fiduciary duty can implicate removal/prohibition if, as potentially 
applicable here, the bank suffers financial loss by reason of the breach. 
Furthermore, such enforcement actions would not be subject to the rigorous 
pleading standards faced in the derivative actions brought by shareholders 
of JPMorgan.66 But, in such removal/prohibition cases, the breach of 
fiduciary duty must also involve “personal dishonesty” or “willful or 
continuing disregard” for the bank’s safety and soundness.67 These 
obstacles are significant and may, therefore, explain the absence of a 
removal/prohibition order against JPMorgan officers and directors. 
As discussed, federal agencies imposed civil money penalties on 
JPMorgan—both the holding company and the bank. For example, the 
OCC’s civil money penalty order found, among other things, the following 
unsafe or unsound banking practices: deficiencies in the bank’s oversight 
and governance of trading by the CIO and deficiencies in risk management 
for the credit derivatives trading by the CIO.68 Given that these findings 
point to JPMorgan’s management function, manager effectiveness seems 
implicated. Most relevant to the London Whale type of scenario, a Second 
Tier civil money penalty can be imposed on officers and directors for 
 
66.  See supra notes 21, 31–36 and accompanying text (discussing the shareholder litigation in 
the London Whale matter). Also, Caremark-type oversight cases require a showing of “conscious 
disregard”—a standard that is difficult to prove. See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text. It 
seems, however, that an administrative enforcement case based on breach of fiduciary duty would not 
be restricted by the statutory exculpation of duty of care claims since an action to remove a director 
would not be “personal liability of a director to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary 
damages.” DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011). A duty of care claim can be based on the failure 
of the board to adequately inform itself, which can be easier to prove than a duty of loyalty/failure of 
oversight claim. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872–73 (Del. 1985), superseded by statute, 
DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011), as recognized in Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 
1095 (Del. 2001). 
67.  See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
68.  See Consent Order for a Civil Money Penalty, supra note 24, at 3–4, 9–13 ($300 million civil 
money penalty imposed on the bank). 
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breach of any fiduciary duty which causes more than a minimal loss.69 
While three civil suits brought against the JPMorgan board were dismissed, 
recall that the dismissal was based on the plaintiff’s failure to meet the 
procedural demand requirements in shareholder derivative proceedings.70 
The dismissal of such suits does not mean that the board, or particular 
members of the board, did not breach their fiduciary duties. And, such 
breach could serve as a basis for a civil money penalty since the loss to the 
bank was more than minimal. 
The agencies’ cease-and-desist power offers the most flexibility. An 
IAP could be subjected to a cease-and-desist order for, among other things, 
engaging in an unsafe or unsound banking practice. Unsafe or unsound 
banking practices are negligence-based since such practices constitute a 
deviation from generally accepted practices of prudent operation.71 The 
twist in the context of the London Whale matter is that while the losses 
were great, such losses never threatened the viability of JPMorgan. Under 
the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of unsafe or unsound, the deficient 
practices that cause losses that do not threaten solvency may not meet the 
standard.72 
For these reasons, the lack of agency action against officers and 
directors can be explained, perhaps, based on the required determinations 
of the relevant statutes. This means that even if JPMorgan’s officers and 
directors had been negligent or grossly negligent in their oversight of the 
company’s risk management systems, significant obstacles might prevent 
agency enforcement action against those individuals. 
III. THE CASE FOR ENHANCED ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT POWERS 
In response to the Financial Crisis, Congress developed an enhanced 
supervisory regime “to prevent or mitigate risks to the financial stability of 
the United States that could arise from the material financial distress or 
failure, or ongoing activities, of large, interconnected financial 
institutions, . . . .”73 Dodd-Frank directs the Federal Reserve to subject 
large bank holding companies with $50 billion or more in assets to “more 
 
69.  12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2)(B) (2012). 
70.  See supra notes 20–21, 31–36 and accompanying text (discussing the shareholder derivative 
suits brought against the JPMorgan board). 
71.  For further discussion, see Schooner, supra note 56, at 187–201. 
72.  Gulf Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., 651 F.2d 259, 264 (5th Cir. 
1981). It is important to note that the facts giving rise to the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Gulf Federal 
pale in comparison to the circumstances of London Whale. In Gulf Federal, the bank miscalculated 
interest on about 400 consumer loans and had sustained no actual losses as a result. Id. at 262–63. Such 
management failure seems on an entirely different scale than the failure of JPMorgan’s risk 
management in London Whale. 
73.  12 U.S.C. § 5365(a) (2012). 
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stringent” prudential supervision than that applied to “bank holding 
companies that do not present similar risks to the financial stability of the 
United States.”74 Dodd-Frank requires the Federal Reserve to establish 
more stringent standards that include: “(i) risk-based capital requirements 
and leverage limits . . . (ii) liquidity requirements; (iii) overall risk 
management requirements; (iv) resolution plan and credit exposure report 
requirements; and (v) concentration limits.”75 Further, publicly traded bank 
holding companies with $10 billion or more in assets must establish a risk 
committee responsible for overall firm risk management.76 Bank holding 
companies with $50 billion or more in assets are subject to an annual stress 
test conducted by the Federal Reserve.77 
Also in response to the Financial Crisis, the OCC developed 
“Guidelines Establishing Heightened Standards” that apply to national 
banks with $50 billion or more in assets.78 The guidelines were developed 
to “enhance [the OCC’s] supervision and strengthen the governance and 
risk management practices of large national banks.”79 The OCC’s 
guidelines direct covered national banks to establish a risk governance 
framework with features to ensure the independence of the risk 
management function from the front line (i.e., revenue generating) units.80 
The guidelines also direct the boards of large national banks to oversee the 
implementation of effective risk governance and to approve any significant 
changes in the framework.81 The OCC indicates that its guidelines are part 
of similar efforts of banking supervisors around the world.82 
While Congress and the banking agencies have clearly shown the 
desire to hold large banks to a higher standard of risk management, no 
analogous directive addresses the liability of individual managers. Officers 
and directors of small community banks are held to the same statutory 
 
74.  Id. § 5365(a)(1)(A). Dodd-Frank’s system of enhanced supervision has been the subject of 
strong criticism. For example, U.S. Representative Hensarling has introduced the Financial Choice Act, 
which would unwind much of the enhanced supervision regime. See Financial CHOICE Act of 2016, 
H.R. 5983, 114th Cong. (2016). 
75.  12 U.S.C. § 5365(b)(1)(A). The Federal Reserve may establish an enhanced supervision that 
relates to contingent capital, resolution plans, public disclosures, and short-term debt limits. Id. 
§ 5365(b)(1)(B). 
76.  Id. § 5365(h). The risk committee must include independent directors and at least one risk 
management expert. Id. § 5365(h)(3). 
77.  Id. § 5365(i)(1). 
78.  12 C.F.R. § 30, Appendix D (2016). 
79.  OCC Guidelines Establishing Heightened Standards, 79 Fed. Reg. 54518 (Sept. 11, 2014). 
80.  12 C.F.R. § 30, Appendix D. 
81.  Id. 
82.  In its final rule adopting, the OCC cites the following: FIN. STABILITY BD., THEMATIC 
REVIEW ON RISK GOVERNANCE PEER REVIEW REPORT (2013); PRINCIPLES FOR AN EFFECTIVE RISK 
APPETITE FRAMEWORK (2013); BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE 
RISK DATA AGGREGATION AND RISK REPORTING (2013). See OCC Guidelines Establishing Heightened 
Standards, 79 Fed. Reg. at 54518 n.4. 
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standards for administrative liability as the officers and directors of the 
largest international banks. Ironically, the reality of too-big-to-fail means, 
effectively, that only the management of smaller banks can be the target of 
powerful civil suits brought by the FDIC as receiver. Adding insult to 
injury, the fact that the directors of smaller institutions are more likely 
directly involved in management probably means that they are also more 
likely targets of administrative enforcement actions in which the standard 
of culpability often requires something closer to intentional or reckless 
behavior. In addition, the increased scrutiny that comes along with bank 
failure83 may also lead to more enforcement actions which, again, means 
that officers and directors of smaller banks are more likely than managers 
of larger institutions to face administrative charges. 
For these reasons, Congress’s demand for enhanced supervision of 
large banks was not matched with a parallel expectation of stricter 
management liability. This seems worthy of reconsideration. Given the 
significant negative externalities associated with the operations of large 
banks, should negligent or grossly negligent behavior by managers go 
unanswered? As discussed above, in the context of London Whale, current 
statutory authority for Second Tier civil money penalties and cease-and-
desist actions might be available based on negligence. The Fifth Circuit’s 
interpretation of “unsafe or unsound practices” might be a potential road 
block.84 And yet, the Fifth Circuit’s narrow interpretation would seem 
contrary to the goals of prudential regulation and to Congress’s intent to 
create a flexible standard. 
As discussed above, the statutory requirements for orders of removal or 
prohibition are especially onerous. The high level of culpability has been 
justified given that an individual’s “livelihood” is at stake.85 This may be a 
powerful concern in the case of officers and directors of small community 
banks. However, such concerns seem far less compelling when considering 
the officers and directors of very large banks. Consider, for example, the 
individuals serving on JPMorgan’s current risk policy committee.86 All are 
retired corporate executive and business owners whose “livelihoods” would 
hardly be at risk if they were to lose their board positions.87 This does not 
mean that their service as directors is not desirable. The expertise of such 
 
83.  A bank failure that results in material loss to the FDIC is subject to an ex post material loss 
review by the supervising agency’s Office of Inspector General. 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(k) (2012). 
84.  See discussion of the Gulf Federal case, supra note 72. 
85.  See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
86.  Risk Policy Committee, JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., https:/www.jpmorganchase.com/ 
corporate/About-JPMC/ab-risk-committee.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2017). 
87.  The members of JPMorgan’s risk policy committee are: Linda Bammann (retired bank 
executive); James S. Crown (president of a family investment company); Timothy P. Flynn (retired 
KPMG executive); and Michel A. Neal (retired GE executive). See id. 
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individuals could be vital to risk management of a highly complex 
institution. Yet, if such directors, or other officers and directors in a similar 
position, were to engage in negligent or grossly negligent behavior, it 
seems appropriate to consider whether the banking agencies should have 
the authority to remove them from the board and prohibit their future 
affiliation with any large bank. When balancing the potential negative 
externalities resulting from negligent management against the loss to 
individuals, the public interest should prevail. 
Objections to any enhanced administrative enforcement powers include 
the potential for abuse by regulators and the related chilling effect on a 
bank’s ability to attract and retain qualified board members. These 
concerns are serious but potentially less serious in the case of large banks. 
While smaller institutions may suffer at the hand of overly zealous or 
arbitrary enforcement, large institutions have the financial and political 
resources to defend such actions. Moreover, administrative enforcement 
actions are subject to judicial review.88 Finally, some objections to 
enhanced administrative enforcement could be addressed by narrowing the 
scope of broader forms of liability. This discussion, for example, focuses 
on enhanced liability for officers and directors of large institutions (those 
subject to enhanced supervision), not smaller ones. In addition, enhanced 
liability standards could apply only to bank executive officers, who have 
direct responsibility for bank management, and not outside directors, whose 
responsibilities are in the nature of oversight only. 
Notwithstanding valid concerns, allowing for administrative sanction 
based on negligent behavior could provide a powerful incentive for the 
officers and directors to exercise all due care (i.e., the absence of 
negligence) in managing these complex organizations. Individuals lacking 
confidence in their ability to devote due care to their management 
responsibilities should decline to serve in that capacity. 
CONCLUSION 
Scholars have argued that existing standards of fiduciary duty do not 
match the responsibilities of directors of large, systemically important, 
financial institutions. Big banks are public instrumentalities by nature and 
the private shareholder value/profit maximization model of governance is 
an ill-suited guide to the management of their operations. This means that 
fiduciary duty principles—as currently imagined—do not demand the kind 
of governance that is appropriate for such firms. Certainly, concepts of 
fiduciary duty could be reformed—and others have suggested such 
 
88.  The respondent in a removal proceeding, for example, may seek judicial review under the 
Administrative Procedure Act. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818(e), (f), (h) (2012). 
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measures. The agencies’ administrative enforcement powers, however, 
should not be overlooked. Existing statutes provide ample authority to the 
banking agencies to address the most egregious behavior—intentional, 
reckless, and willful behavior. But existing statutes create obstacles for 
regulators’ pursuit of administrative sanction against board members who 
have behaved negligently, even if the behavior is grossly negligent. With 
regard to the officers and directors of large financial institutions, this lack 
of enforcement power is at odds with Congress’s creation of heightened 
supervision for large banks. Establishing more stringent rules, but then 
holding management responsible (theoretically) for failure to adhere to 
such rules only when their behavior is especially egregious, is a system that 
provides weak incentives for proper management of the largest financial 
institutions. Strong administrative enforcement authority could better 
match the need for heightened supervision of large financial institutions 
with private incentives to ensure that stricter standards are achieved. 
 
